Fairfield University

DigitalCommons@Fairfield
Business Faculty Publications

Charles F. Dolan School of Business

2015

Combating Turbulence in the Equity Market: Get the Listed
Companies on Board
Nazli Sila Alan
Fairfield University, nalan@fairfield.edu

Timothy Mahoney
Robert A. Schwartz

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/business-facultypubs

Copyright 2015 Institutional Investor Inc
The final publisher PDF has been archived here with permission from the copyright holder.

Repository Citation
Alan, Nazli Sila; Mahoney, Timothy; and Schwartz, Robert A., "Combating Turbulence in the Equity Market:
Get the Listed Companies on Board" (2015). Business Faculty Publications. 168.
https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/business-facultypubs/168

Published Citation
Alan, Nazli Sila, Timothy Mahoney, and Robert A. Schwartz. 2015. "INVITED EDITORIAL: Combating Turbulence in
the Equity Market: Get the Listed Companies on Board." Journal of Portfolio Management 41 (4): 8-11.
This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rightsholder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license
in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@fairfield.edu.

INVITED EDITORIAL

Combating Turbulence in the Equity
Market: Get the Listed Companies on Board
Nazli Sila A lan, Timothy M ahoney, and Robert A. Schwartz

W

hat equity market participant could ever
forget the month of October 1987? It
was a wild, turbulent time, and Monday,
October 19 was a black day: the Dow
Jones Average of 30 industrial stocks dropped 508 points
on that day to close down 22.61%. But the dramatic plunge
on the 19th is not what captures our attention in this piece.
Rather, we are drawn to the sharp market swings of more
than a quarter of a century ago, and the fact that, to the
current day, bouts of sharply accentuated, short-period
volatility continue to characterize our equity market.1
How might we deal with such turbulence?
Our answer: get the listed companies involved in
providing liquidity for their own shares. On October 19,
more than 604 million shares of NYSE-listed stocks traded.
Although this number was enormous relative to the New
York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE) 1987 average daily trading
volume of 189 million shares, it was only roughly 1% of the
total number of shares outstanding.2 This very small percentage suggests that a corporation could relatively easily
bring meaningful liquidity to the market for its stock.
October 1987 was fraught with major economic
uncertainties: concern about a federal budget deficit, a
trade deficit, rising interest rates, a threat of renewed inf lation and, as the market opened on October 19, news that an
Iranian oil platform in the Persian Gulf had been bombed
by warships thought to be American. But the precipitous
decline on October 19 was not attributable to fundamentals
alone. In response to the falling market, portfolio insurance programs had kicked in, driving prices into virtual
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free fall as orders and quotes disappeared on the buyers’
side of the market.
John Phelan, then CEO of the NYSE, recognized
that the October 19 plunge was in good part a technical
event driven by the portfolio insurance programs. To reassure investors and to stem a further decline, Phelan stepped
forward. On October 20, he and his chief lieutenants at the
exchange hit the telephones, asking CEOs and other top
brass at the listed companies to buy back their own shares.
His efforts were successful. According to a report by the
SEC’s Division of Market Regulation, close to 600 firms
announced open-market repurchase programs during the
two weeks following the crash.3 With this corporate support, the market regained normality.4
And so a powerful idea was pushed to the fore: get the
listed companies involved in providing liquidity for their
own shares. Phelan, however, was not the first to think
of involving listed companies in the quest for improved
market quality. Recognizing the accentuated range over
which share prices can f luctuate, in their classic book,
Graham and Dodd [1934] wrote:
“It follows that the responsibility of managements to
act in the interest of their shareholders includes the
obligation to prevent—in so far as they are able—the
establishment of either absurdly high or unduly low
prices for their securities.”

Let us further consider the need to get listed companies involved.
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THE NEED TO ENHANCE MARKET LIQUIDITY
AND QUALITY OF PRICE DISCOVERY

As the f lash crash on May 6, 2010, dramatically
underscored, markets are prone to unwarranted instability.
Virtually every day, intra-day price volatility is elevated.5
Unsurprisingly, on both sides of the Atlantic regulators are
giving a good deal of attention to proposals for improving
market liquidity and the quality of price discovery.
These proposals include imposing a special fee on
trading, requiring that unexecuted orders remain posted
for a minimum resting time, and attracting a larger portion
of market-maker capital, either by granting dealers subsidies or by giving them additional perks. Will regulatory
approaches such as these accomplish their desired objective? Each of them has been criticized, and we wonder if
regulators are looking in the right direction.
To answer this question, it is important to recognize that 1) insufficient liquidity provision and the complexity of price discovery cause accentuated volatility;
2) our continuously trading markets achieve imperfect
liquidity and price discovery through orders placed by
public limit-order traders, by traditional market-makers,
and by high-frequency traders (HFT), a more recent breed
of participants who also have a market-maker role; 3) in
addition to the participants in the individual trades, a wide
spectrum of investors is affected by intra-day volatility and
the attending complexity of price discovery.
For the most part, regulatory proposals have focused
on controlling the limit-order traders, dealers, and HFT
participants. However, these proposals fail to take into
account an important reality: in acting out of their own
self-interests, none of these participants is incented to do
whatever is best for the market as a whole. Why? Because
price determination in the equity markets is a public good,
precisely because investors who are not trade participants
care about and are affected by the prices that trades establish. Market prices are used to mark positions to market,
as well as in derivative trading, estate valuations, mutual
fund valuations, dark pool pricing, and by corporations
assessing their costs of capital.
Economists recognize that free markets undersupply
public goods. We should not try to overcome this reality
by imposing cumbersome carrot and stick rules on standard market participants. Sound public policy should
honor the fact that not one of them—not the limit order
placers, nor the standard market makers, nor the new HFT
players—is incented to supply adequate amounts of the
public good. Why should they? But if these participants are

not so incented, who is? The listed companies themselves,
as we will explain shortly. First, we consider the role of
traditional market makers.
TRADITIONAL MARKET MAKERS

The standard view in the microstructure literature is
that market makers are suppliers, not of liquidity per se, but
of immediacy, while the “naturals” provide liquidity itself.
That is, public buyers supply liquidity to public sellers (and
vice versa). This is most understandable. Market makers
certainly need to keep their share inventories in reasonable
balance, and no market maker can continue to buy shares
from public participants who are looking to sell without
re-liquefying by selling shares to other public participants
who are looking to buy (and vice versa). In this context,
the bid–ask spread is the market maker’s compensation for
providing immediacy to public participants.
However, inadequate immediacy provision is not
the problem that regulators are addressing (and, in any
event, immediacy for large-cap stocks is largely provided
by limit orders that public participants place in the book).
From a public policy perspective, the problem is the price
turbulence that occurs when the book becomes unduly
sparse. Controlling this turbulence calls for providing
supplemental liquidity.
A market maker’s economic function has historically
extended beyond providing immediacy. The NYSE specialists of old were responsible for making fair and orderly
markets, and both specialists and Nasdaq market makers
have played key price discovery roles. In today’s turbulent
environment, it is not surprising that regulators would
look to traditional market makers for answers. However,
it is unrealistic to expect traditional market makers to
apply their capital with an unprofitable intensity, and it
is important to recognize that the public goods benefits
that enhanced liquidity and price discovery bestow on the
broader community are not monetized for market makers.
With this in mind, we turn to a market maker-type role
that a listed company can play.
LISTED COMPANIES

Some may not think that a listed company’s functions extend to serving as a market maker. An automaker,
for instance, is in the business of producing cars, not
making the market for its stock. But this understanding is
unduly limited. A company should be involved, for it is
better positioned than a traditional market maker, limit-
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order trader, or HFT participant to internalize the public
goods benefits that attend deeper liquidity provision and
enhanced price discovery. This is because a corporation
seeks not to realize profits from trading per se, but to
maximize the value of its shares. To the extent that poor
price discovery and turbulent price changes have negative
consequences for the broader array of market participants,
the value of a company’s shares can be impaired, raising
its cost of capital.
Because the markets for small- and medium-sized
companies are generally less liquid than those for blue
chips, we expect that smaller companies in particular
would benefit from instituting stabilization programs.
Moreover, because they typically have lower free f loat,
smaller companies are more prone to being gamed with
relatively less money. We also suggest that the more widely
corporate liquidity-provided stabilization programs are
used, the more effective they will collectively be in tempering broad market swings that include stocks of all cap
sizes.
Precedents exist for companies having meaningful
associations with market makers for their stocks. Historically, NYSE specialists have maintained contacts with the
management of the companies whose shares had been
allocated to them. Currently, in five European countries
(France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal)
sell-side intermediaries called “designated sponsors” contract with the listed companies (generally one or two to a
company) to enter orders that, by reducing spreads, make
the markets for the companies’ shares more liquid.6 And
corporations have historically bought back their own
shares, not simply because they feel the price is right from
an investment prospective, but also to stabilize their share
values when they believe a short-run price decrease is not
justified.
Schwartz [1988] and more recently Alan et al. [2015]
have set forth a specific procedure by which a listed company could more directly provide supplemental liquidity
for its shares. The proposal calls for a company to establish a fund run by a third-party fiduciary to buy back the
company’s shares in a falling market and sell its shares in a
rising market. Importantly, the procedure would be totally
transparent, with all parameters announced well in advance
and the companies committing to the program for a prespecified, adequately long period of time.
When it comes to a listed company taking a more
direct role in making a market for its own shares, a primary
concern is the possibility that the firm will manipulate
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its share price. Alan et al. [2015] address this issue (along
with the more general problem of gaming). They argue
that the defense against manipulation (and gaming) lies in
the high degree of transparency that their procedure calls
for, along with requiring that all relevant parameters be
pre-announced and that a third-party intermediary, such
as a designated sponsor, play an important fiduciary and
advisory role. Moreover, the transparent presence of the
large corporate orders would make it more difficult for
other participants to manipulate the market.
Any specific plan to have a listed company bring
supplemental liquidity to the market would unquestionably
require further thought and analysis. Nevertheless, one
reality is clear: for the public goods benefits that additional
liquidity would provide to be more fully realized, the listed
companies must be involved.
ENDNOTES
Following Black Monday in 1987, the market reversed
direction on October 20 and 21, with the Dow regaining 289
points to end the day 16.03% higher than its October 19 close.
October 26 saw another big drop (156.83 points or 8.04%),
after which the DOW continued to climb for the remainder
of the month.
2
See http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/19/ususa-markets-blackmonday-idUSBRE89I0YA20121019 and
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/city_
room/20071019_CITYROOM.pdf.
3
See Division of Market Regulation [1988].
4
Eventually, many firms did not actually carry the programs out, as discussed by Netter and Mitchell [1989].
5
For further discussion, see Alan and Schwartz [2013].
6
In practice, designated sponsors have supplied liquidity
for the less liquid small-cap and mid-cap stocks, not for bluechip stocks.
1
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